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Abstract
This paper provides an empirical investigation of the factors that in￿ uence the appearance
and success of voter referenda for policies designed to promote open-space conservation.
We take advantage of a data set that includes detailed information on all such referenda
that occurred in the United States between 1998 and 2003. Combining these data with
information from the U.S. Census, we conduct a nationwide analysis along with focused
analyses of referenda that occurred in New Jersey and Massachusetts. Among the questions
that we consider are the following: What factors contribute to the appearance of an open-
space referendum in a jurisdiction? How does an initiative￿ s funding mechanism￿ such as a
bond, property tax, sales tax, or income tax￿ a⁄ect the way citizens vote? How responsive
are favorable votes to the costs of an open-space initiative? And how do socioeconomic
characteristics a⁄ect demand for public provision of open space?
JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: H41, Q38, Q58.1 Introduction
The protection of open space from the advance of ￿urban sprawl￿has emerged as one of the
more pressing environmental issues in the United States. Open space is generally understood
to be a public good that will be under-provided without policy interventions. Policy-makers
have begun e⁄orts to protect open-space using various instruments￿ including zoning reg-
ulations, development taxes, urban growth boundaries, conservation easements, and public
acquisition of undeveloped land. Increasingly, citizens are also becoming directly involved
in open-space conservation through ballot initiatives designed to implement mechanisms for
public land acquisition. Nearly 1,000 jurisdictions at the state, county, and local levels
held open-space referenda between 1998 and 2003, and approximately 80 percent of these
initiatives passed.
The proliferation and high success rate of open-space ballot initiatives raise several eco-
nomic and policy-relevant questions. What factors contribute to the appearance of an open-
space referendum in a jurisdiction? How does an initiative￿ s funding mechanism￿ such as a
bond, property tax, sales tax, or income tax￿ a⁄ect the way citizens vote? How responsive
are favorable votes to the costs of an open-space initiative? How do socioeconomic char-
acteristics in￿ uence demand and therefore voting results for open-space conservation? And
what other features of a referendum a⁄ect voting outcomes?
These questions motivate our analysis in this paper. We construct a data set of open-space
referenda that occurred in the United States between 1998 and 2003. Detailed information
on each referendum comes from annual reports, titled LandVote, that are published by the
Trust for Public Lands (TPL) and the Land Trust Alliance (LTA).1 These data include each
referendum￿ s political jurisdiction, proportion voting for and against, ￿nancing mechanism,
￿nancing rate, land characteristics, and other policy-relevant variables. For each jurisdiction
1The reports were published as Voters Invest in Open Space between 1998 and 2000 and were renamed
LandVote beginning in 2001. In total, these reports summarize the results of 968 state, county, and local
ballot questions on open space. The reports attempt to be comprehensive and include only referenda involving
the direct acquisition of undeveloped land or farmland; ballot measures for related policies, such as growth
controls, are excluded.
1we also collect data from the U.S. Census on socioeconomic characteristics. Then, using
the combined data, we estimate econometric models to determine the impact of referendum
characteristics and socioeconomic variables on voting results.
In addition to the nationwide analysis, we conduct two focused analyses of referenda that
occurred in New Jersey and Massachusetts. Because of statewide policies that provide incen-
tives for local jurisdictions to raise taxes for open-space conservation, there were numerous
referenda in both states￿ 237 in New Jersey and 137 in Massachusetts. For both states,
we collect further Census data on all jurisdictions that did not hold referenda. We then
estimate two models for each state: one to predict the probability that a jurisdiction has
held an open-space referendum, and another to explain voting results conditional on having
held a referendum.
Other researchers have investigated related questions. In a pioneering study of referenda
results, Deacon and Shapiro (1975) analyze voting outcomes for a law in California to protect
coastal zones from development. They ￿nd evidence that the natural coastal environment is
a normal good, but the e⁄ect is not highly signi￿cant. Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) also an-
alyze statewide referenda in California. Three of the referenda they study were to authorize
bond issues to purchase park, forest, and wildlife areas. They ￿nd evidence that collectively
provided open space is a normal good, except when income is very high, in which case it
becomes inferior. They also ￿nd that people are more likely to vote yes in more urban coun-
ties. Another study by Kline and Wichelns (1994) uses statewide referenda in Pennsylvania
and Rhode Island to investigate demand for the purchase of farmland development rights.
They ￿nd that the proportion of yes votes increases with a town￿ s population growth, home
value appreciation, farmland loss, urbanization, and prevalence of resource sensitive lands.
Because the aforementioned studies use local voting results in statewide referenda, they
cannot address the question of what factors contribute to the appearance of an open-space
referendum in the ￿rst place. Howell-Moroney (2004) considers this question in a study of
municipalities throughout the Delaware Valley region. He ￿nds that the appearance of a
referendum is responsive to patterns of land use, whereby low population density and loss
2of open space increase the probability of a referendum occurring. He also ￿nds the higher
population and median household income increases the probability of a referendum. Howell-
Moroney￿ s study is a response to another paper by Romero and Liserio (2002). The latter
uses nationwide data on referenda that occurred between 1998 and 1999, and it ￿nds that
only socioeconomic factors motivate open-space referenda, while actual patterns of land use
do not play a role.2
Our paper makes four primary contributions to the literature. First, using the most
comprehensive data set on open-space referenda to date, we analyze voting results using
theoretically based econometric models. Second, we use variation in the ￿nancing mechanism
across referenda (e.g., bonds or taxes) to investigate whether the type of mechanism proposed
a⁄ects voter support for open-space acquisition. Third, we exploit variation is the funding
rates within the di⁄erent mechanisms (e.g., bond amounts and tax rates) to determine how
responsive voters are to the costs of an open-space initiative. Fourth, we conduct detailed
analyses of two states in order to determine the factors that in￿ uence the appearance of a
referendum, in addition to the factors that in￿ uence the success of a referendum.
The results provide new insights into demand for open space and into the relationship
between characteristics of an open-space policy and voter support. We ￿nd strong evidence
that voters are more like to approve bonds than tax increases. Not surprisingly, funding
rates also matter￿ with higher rates generally decreasing the odds of a yes vote. Interest-
ingly, the opposite result emerges at the state and county levels, perhaps due to the potential
for ￿spillin￿e⁄ects. In general, we ￿nd that the factors in￿ uencing referenda outcomes di⁄er
between the state and county levels and the local level. We also ￿nd evidence that jurisdic-
tions holding open-space referenda di⁄er signi￿cantly from those that do not. Most notably,
referenda tend to occur in wealthier and lower density communities that have experienced
greater population growth. While socioeconomic and demographic variables in￿ uence where
referenda occur, they have less of an e⁄ect on election outcomes. Nevertheless, we ￿nd fur-
2Romero and Liserio￿ s (2002) conclusion is questionable, however, because of a number of methodological
concerns. See Howell-Moroney (2004) for a detailed discussion.
3ther evidence that collectively provided open space is a normal good. Other ￿ndings relate to
the importance of farmland as a type of open space and to speci￿c features of the proposed
open-space policies.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used
in the analysis. Section 3 provides details on our econometric speci￿cation and estimation.
Section 4 reports the results of the nationwide analysis along with the results of the New
Jersey and Massachusetts studies. Section 5 concludes with a summary of the main results.
2 Data
We collected data from two primary sources: the annual LandVote survey published by the
Trust for Public Lands (TPL) and the Land Trust Alliance (LTA), and the U.S. Census online
summary ￿les for 1990 and 2000. The LandVote survey attempts to provide a comprehensive
listing of all open-space referenda that involve the direct acquisition of undeveloped land.4
Using the information contained in the LandVote survey, we generated variables for several
characteristics of each open-space referendum. These variables include whether the initiative
passed, proportion voting yes, level of government, funding mechanism, funding rate, whether
farmland was included as part of the initiative, and whether the initiative extended an
existing program or created a new one. For each jurisdiction, we then obtained Census data
on population, population growth, population density, age pro￿le, household income, home
value, and home ownership rate.
Further data was collected for the New Jersey and Massachusetts studies. To compare
jurisdictions that did and did not hold a referendum, we collected Census data for all local
jurisdictions in both states. We also collected data on policy variables that are speci￿c to
3Many of our results are comparable to ￿ndings in other strands of the literature on open space. These
studies employ contingent valuation (Bre› e, Morey, Lodder, 1998; Champ et al., 2002; Vossler et al., 2003),
stated preferences for di⁄erent types of open space (Kline and Wichelns, 1998), and revealed preferences for
existing open space (Bates and Santerre, 2001). We refer to the ￿ndings of these studies where appropriate
in the discussion of our results.
4Publication of the LandVote survey began in 1998, and data for selected years are available online at
www.landvote.org. Data for other years can be obtained from the TPL or the authors upon request.
4the ballot initiatives in each state. These additional variables are discussed later in Sections
4.2 and 4.3.
Of the 968 referenda in the LandVote survey between 1998 and 2003, a total of 857
observations were included in the ￿nal data set. The remaining 111 observations were not
included for four possible reasons. First, the referenda￿ s jurisdiction was a park district that
was not coterminous with any jurisdiction for which we could obtain corresponding Census
data (27 observations). Second, the information provided in LandVote was not su¢ cient to
match the jurisdiction with a corresponding location in the U.S. Census (14 observations).5
Third, the initiative was passed in a town meeting rather than having been put to a general
election (7 observations). Finally, the referendum￿ s ￿nancing data was not available because
it was missing or the initiative did not involve a direct commitment of funds, as is the case
with a simple advisory measure (63 observations).
The 857 referenda included in the data set occurred in 771 di⁄erent jurisdictions. Eighty-
six jurisdictions held more than one referendum between 1998 and 2003. In some cases more
than one attempt was made to pass an open-space policy, while in other cases more than one
policy was approved. The entire data set covers 38 di⁄erent states, although the majority
of referenda took place in the northeast and mid-atlantic regions.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics. Eighty percent of the ballot measures passed, with
an average of 61 percent of the electorate voting yes. A large majority of the referenda were
conducted in local jurisdictions (including cities, towns, townships, boroughs, and villages),
with comparatively few in counties and states. Property tax increases and bond issues con-
stitute the majority of the funding mechanisms; each accounts for approximately one-third
of the measures. Property tax surcharges are the next most prevalent funding mechanism
and constitute 15 percent of the measures. The remaining referenda are divided among sales
tax increases, income tax surcharges, and a category for other funding mechanisms.6
5These observations could not be clari￿ed even after contacting TPL and receiving assistance in trying
to resolve referendum locations.
6The Other category includes parcel taxes, real estate transfer taxes, use taxes, retailers￿occupation
taxes, lottery taxes, hotel taxes, and intragovernmental transfers.
5Table 1: Descriptive statistics of open-space referenda
Panel A: Summary of referenda results by level of government
Proportion Proportion yes votes
N Passing Mean Std. Dev.
State 23 0.87 0.63 0.10
County 146 0.76 0.58 0.12
Local 688 0.80 0.61 0.12
Total 857 0.80 0.61 0.12
Panel B: Summary of referenda results by funding mechanism
Proportion Proportion yes votes
N Passing Mean Std. Dev.
Proptax 299 0.83 0.60 0.10
Proptaxsur 131 0.57 0.51 0.12
Bond 280 0.90 0.66 0.11
Salestax 49 0.65 0.54 0.13
Inctaxsur 28 0.79 0.60 0.11
Other 72 0.79 0.62 0.13
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for funding rates
Units Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Proptaxrate mills 0.282 0.370 0.001 2.5
Proptaxsurrate percent 2.51 0.78 0.5 3
Bondrate $10,000,000 4.66 23.50 0.0025 230
Salestaxrate percent 0.437 0.397 0.03 0.2
Inctaxsurrate percent 0.228 0.133 0.00125 0.5
Notes: Proptax is property tax, Proptaxsur is property tax surcharge, Bond
is bond, Salestax is sales tax, and Inctaxsur is income tax surcharge. The
funding rate variables correspond with the funding mechanism variables. The
total number of referenda in Panel B is 859 because two of the referenda included
more than one funding mechanism.
6It is not reported in Table 1 but worth mentioning that the di⁄erent ￿nancing mechanisms
were not evenly distributed among the levels of government. Seventy percent of the state-
level referenda were for bond issues, and the remaining thirty percent were in the ￿other￿
category. In contrast, 40 percent of the county-level referenda were bond issues, and 50
percent were property tax or sales tax increases. The ￿nancing mechanisms were more
evenly distributed among the local-level referenda.
Panel B in Table 1 reveals variation in voting outcomes among the ￿nancing mechanisms.
Bonds generate the highest pass rate and the largest proportion of yes votes. Property tax
surcharges and sales taxes, in contrast, generate substantially lower pass rates and propor-
tions of yes votes. These di⁄erences suggest that ￿nance mechanisms may a⁄ect the outcomes
of open-space referenda. In the next section, we specify regression models to test for such
mechanism e⁄ects while controlling for other factors that may in￿ uence election results.7
Panel C in Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the funding rate variables. For
example, the mean property tax increase was 0.28 mills (i.e. 28 cents per thousand dollars of
tax-assessed value). The variation in magnitude within the funding rates is quite pronounced.
The property tax increases, for example, range from 0.001 mills to 2.5 mills. This di⁄erence
implies that for a household with a tax-assessed property value of $150,000, the increased
tax burden ranges from 15 cents per year to $375 per year. The bond amounts also cover
a wide range, from $25,000 in Baltimore County, Maryland to $2.3 billion in the state of
California. With our econometric analysis that we describe in the next section, we also test
whether funding rates a⁄ect voting outcomes.
The socioeconomic variables that we obtained from the U.S. Census are de￿ned in Ta-
ble 2. When appropriate, we report means for jurisdictions that held a referendum and
compare them to the national averages. The t-statistics are based on a test of whether the
sample mean is statistically di⁄erent from the national average. All tests are statistically
7A distinct advantage of the data is the fact that jurisdictions are often constrained regarding their choice
of funding mechanism. In New Jersey and Massachusetts, for example, state law requires property taxes and
property tax surcharges, respectively. Thus, in our econometric models, it is reasonable to treat the funding
mechanism as exogenous to the degree of voter support.
7Table 2: Descriptive statistics of socioeconomics variables
Variable De￿nition Sample Nation t-stat.
Population Population of jurisdiction ￿ ￿ ￿
in 100,000s ￿
Popnchg Population change between 1990 0.28 0.13 3.55
and 2000 as a proportion (1.25)
Density Population density in 1,000s 1.36 0.10 20.95
per square mile (1.76)
Under18 Proportion of population under 0.25 0.26 5.60
age 18 (0.04)
Over65 Proportion of population over 0.13 0.12 1.24
age 65 (0.06)
Income Median household income in 6.26 4.20 28.83
$10,000s (2.10)
Homevalue Median value of owner-occupied 2.10 1.20 23.36
housing in $100,000s (1.14)
Homeown Proportion of occupied housing 0.76 0.66 20.13
units that are owner-occupied (0.14)
Notes: All variables are from the 2000 U.S. Census unless indicated otherwise.
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Statistics are not reported for
Population because the jurisdictions are not homogenous or comparable. The na-
tional average for Density includes only the contiguous 48 states.
8signi￿cant except for the one comparing the proportions of the population over the age of
65. Compared to national averages, jurisdictions that have held an open-space referendum
tend to have higher population growth and greater density.8 They also tend to have greater
household incomes, home values, and home ownership rates. In our studies of New Jersey
and Massachusetts, we estimate logit models to test formally for di⁄erences between those
jurisdictions that have held a referendum and those that have not.
3 Speci￿cation and Estimation
We estimate regression models to explain the election outcomes of open-space referenda.







where Pi is the proportion of yes votes out of the total number of votes cast in referendum
i. This variable is the logit transformation of Pi, and it is often referred to as the log-odds
ratio, which is commonly used in econometric models of aggregate voting results.9










6Govi + ￿s + ￿t + "ist, (2)
where s denotes state and t denotes year; Mechi is a categorical variable indicating the
referendum￿ s funding mechanism; Ratei is a vector of funding rate variables that equal
zero if the funding rate does not apply; Extendi is a dummy variable indicating whether
8It is worth keeping in mind that the national average for Density is based on all land area in the lower
48 states, including the large and sparsely populated areas in the west. Later in the paper, we report results
showing that Density is actually lower in jurisdictions that have held an open-space referendum.
9For examples, see Deacon and Shapiro (1975), Rubinfeld (1977), Dubin, Kiewiet, and Noussair (1992),
Kline and Wichelns (1994), Kahn and Matsusaka (1997), and Vossler et al. (2003).
9the referendum extends an existing policy; Farmi is a dummy variable indicating whether
farmland is part of the proposed land acquisitions; Socioi is a vector of socioeconomic
variables that includes those listed in Table 2; Govi is a categorical variable indicating
whether the referendum occurred at the state, county, or local level; ￿s is a state-speci￿c
intercept; ￿t is a year-speci￿c intercept; and "ist is a random error term.
The log-odds model speci￿ed in (2) has a microeconomic foundation. Deacon and Shapiro
(1975) develop a model that begins with individual preferences and aggregates up to collective
voting results. The log-odds speci￿cation is a simpli￿ed version of their model￿ s empirical
implication.10 This micro foundation implies that the aggregate voting results can be used to
make inferences about voters￿underlying demand for open space. The validity of making such
inferences has empirical support as well. A study by Fischel (1979) found little di⁄erence in a
comparison between aggregate voting results and individual preferences for an environmental
referendum in New Hampshire.
With the theoretical foundation of (2), the independent variables are useful for answering
several questions and controlling for potentially important e⁄ects. The inclusion of Mechi
and Ratei enables consideration of how voting outcomes respond to the proposed funding
mechanism and funding rate. Extendi and Farmi will determine whether selected charac-
teristics of the open-space proposal a⁄ect its success. Socioi will be useful to detect factors
that in￿ uence demand for open space, such as income and population density. Govi will
indicate whether election results di⁄er between levels of government. Finally, the state- and
year-speci￿c intercepts will control for unobserved state and year e⁄ects.
We estimate the models using weighted least squares (WLS) to account for heteroskdas-
ticity due to the analysis of averaged, grouped data. The weight for each observation i is
(ni ^ Pi(1 ￿ ^ Pi))
1
2, where ni is Population and ^ Pi is the predicted proportion of yes votes.11
10The simpli￿cation arises because, like most studies, we do not consider abstentions. Rubinfeld (1977)
develops a voting model that ignores abstentions and also generates a log-odds speci￿cation. While his model
is discussed in the context of voting in local school elections, the analysis can apply equally to open-space
measures.
11We use ordinary least squares to obtain initial values of ^ Pi. We then iterate to convergence with WLS.
See Greene (2000) for details on the use of these weights and on the method of estimation.
10Using these weights implements the minimum chi-squared estimator, and the e⁄ect is to
place more weight on referenda in jurisdictions with larger populations.
Our analysis of New Jersey and Massachusetts referenda di⁄ers somewhat because of the
availability and nature of the data. Using the additional Census data on jurisdictions having
not held an open-space referendum, we are able to investigate the factors that in￿ uence the
appearance of a referendum in a local jurisdiction. We assume that the underlying propensity
of a jurisdiction to hold a referendum is given by
r
￿
i = ￿ + ￿
0Socioi + ui. (3)
While r￿
i is unobservable, we do observe whether or not a jurisdiction actually held a refer-
endum. The observations can therefore be written as ri = 1 if r￿
i > 0, or ri = 0 if r￿
i ￿ 0.
Assuming ui has a logistic distribution, the parameters of (3) can be estimated with a logit
model:
Pr(ri = 1) = ￿(￿ + ￿
0Socioi), (4)
where ￿(￿) is the logistic cumulative distribution function. We estimate this model for both
New Jersey and Massachusetts in order to determine how socioeconomic characteristics a⁄ect
a jurisdiction￿ s probability of holding an open-space referendum.
We also estimate log-odds models for New Jersey and Massachusetts to explain election
outcomes where they did occur. For these models, we include only those referenda that were
part of statewide initiatives to encourage open-space conservation (described in Sections 4.2
and 4.3). These include all of the 237 referenda in New Jersey and 122 of the 137 referenda in
Massachusetts. A nice feature of these data is that all referenda within each state proposed
the same funding mechanism but with varying funding rates. Accordingly, the models require
fewer explanatory variables than were included in (2). The estimated equations have the
general form
logoddsit = ￿1Ratei + ￿
0
2X i + ￿
0
3Socioi + ￿t + vit, (5)
11where Ratei is a variable for the funding rate of the mechanism within the state, X i is vector
of state-speci￿c policy variables, ￿t is a year-speci￿c intercept, and vit is a random error term.
These models are estimated with WLS using the same weights as those discussed previously.
4 Results
We report the econometric results in this section. Those for the nationwide analysis are
reported ￿rst, followed by those for New Jersey and Massachusetts.
4.1 Nationwide
We begin by estimating equation (2) with the nationwide sample of 857 referenda. These
results are reported as the pooled model in Table 3. We also estimate equation (2) using two
subsets of the data: one includes all of the local-level referenda, and the other includes all
of the state- and county-level referenda. These models are reported as the local and state-
county models in Table 3.12 For all three models, we report standard errors that are robust
to clustering at the jurisdiction level. This accounts for the fact some referenda occurred
within the same jurisdiction and therefore may not be entirely independent observations.13
The reason for estimating the pooled and separate equations is to test whether the ex-
planatory variables a⁄ect local results di⁄erently than state and county results. Combining
all the data may be overly restrictive because of the di⁄erences in scale and political dynam-
ics between these levels of government. One might expect, for example, that demand for
open space may di⁄er at the local level because of the smaller number of taxpayers and/or
the closer proximity to the proposed land acquisitions.14 A further reason for splitting the
data in this manner follows from the weighted estimation, which places more weight on the
12We also estimated all of the models without state ￿xed e⁄ects; however, we do not report these results
because they are very similar to those reported in Table 3.
13The clustering allows for arbitrary correlation among the error terms for observations within the same
jurisdiction. While clustering has no e⁄ect on the coe¢ cient estimates, it produces standard errors that are
generally larger than those produced without clustering.
14Bre› e, Morey, and Lodder (1998) and Champ et al. (2002) ￿nd empirical evidence that people place
greater value on open space when they live closer to it.
12higher-population (i.e., state and county) observations in the pooled model. This explains
why many of the coe¢ cient estimates in the pooled model are closer to those in the state-
county model than they are to those in the local model. To test formally for di⁄erences,
we conduct a Chow test comparing the separate estimates to the pooled estimates. The
results indicate statistically signi￿cant di⁄erences between the local and state-county results
(F[22,772] = 4.49, p < 0.01). In the following discussion, therefore, we focus primarily on
the results of the local and state-county models.
First consider the e⁄ects of the di⁄erent ￿nancing mechanisms. Bonds are the omitted
category, so coe¢ cients are interpreted as the pairwise comparison between the indicated
mechanism and bonds. A clear pattern emerges from the results: nearly all coe¢ cients are
negative, indicating that voters are more likely to approve bond issues than tax increases.
The di⁄erence between sales taxes and bonds is statistically signi￿cant in all models. In
the local model, property tax surcharges are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from bonds. In the state-
county model, property taxes and ￿other￿mechanisms are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from bonds.
Several coe¢ cients on the statistically signi￿cant funding mechanisms have magnitudes
close to (or in excess of) -0.40, which implies a decrease of approximately 33 percent on the
odds ratio.15 This implies that, beginning from an average of 60 percent of the electorate
voting yes (with an odds ratio of 1.4), the model predicts that switching from a bond to one
of the taxes would decrease the proportion of yes votes to roughly 48 percent (with an odds
ratio of 0.94). Note that this di⁄erence is pivotal for a referendum that requires a 50 percent
majority to pass: on average, ￿nancing with a bond or a tax makes the di⁄erence between
whether or not an open-space referendum passes.
So why might voters prefer bonds? We suggest four possible reasons. First, citizens
may perceive bonds to generate the necessary funding for an acquisition immediately, while
they may not expect bene￿ts from a tax for several years. Second, bonds are more likely to
be associated with speci￿c open-space acquisitions, whereas tax revenues are more likely to
15The percentage change in the odds ratio with a change in a dummy variable from 0 to 1 is given by
e￿ ￿ 1, where ￿ is the coe¢ cient on the dummy variable (see Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980).
13Table 3: Nationwide, Local, and State-County WLS regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Pooled Local State-County
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Proptax -0.368￿￿￿ (0.121) -0.131 (0.199) -0.346￿￿ (0.135)
Proptaxsur -0.631￿ (0.386) -0.492￿ (0.331) ￿ ￿
Salestax -0.354￿ (0.187) -0.490￿￿￿ (0.138) -0.426￿ (0.247)
Inctaxsur -0.672￿￿ (0.278) -0.204 (0.263) ￿ ￿
Other -0.237￿￿￿ (0.093) 0.065 (0.117) -0.211￿ (0.125)
Proptaxrate 0.396￿￿￿ (0.155) -0.280￿ (0.159) 0.524￿￿ (0.208)
Proptaxsurrate -0.080 (0.091) -0.042 (0.083) ￿ ￿
Bondrate 0.002￿￿￿ (0.001) -0.040￿￿ (0.017) 0.002￿￿￿ (0.001)
Salestaxrate -0.219￿ (0.217) -0.063 (0.118) -0.093 (0.288)
Inctaxsurrate -1.014 (0.924) -0.882 (0.829) ￿ ￿
Extend 0.557￿￿￿ (0.122) 0.190 (0.133) 0.500￿￿￿ (0.142)
Farm -0.081 (0.059) 0.139 (0.086) -0.095 (0.076)
Population -0.001 (0.001) 0.038￿￿￿ (0.010) -0.000 (0.001)
Popnchg -0.022 (0.024) 0.000 (0.012) -0.139 (0.243)
Density 0.013 (0.022) -0.016 (0.026) -0.001 (0.040)
Under18 1.668 (1.449) -1.627 (1.125) 1.679 (3.041)
Over65 1.756￿￿ (0.816) 0.529 (0.691) 2.126 (2.005)
Income 0.078￿￿￿ (0.027) 0.073￿￿￿ (0.026) 0.116 (0.075)
Homeown -1.304￿￿ (0.571) -0.577 (0.625) -1.169 (1.318)
State -0.070 (0.130) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
County -0.153￿￿ (0.079) ￿ ￿ -0.010 (0.187)
Constant 0.287 (0.373) 0.992￿￿￿ (0.343) -0.317 (0.803)
State dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 857 688 169
R-squared 0.78 0.54 0.88
Notes: The dependent variable in all models is logoddsi. Bond is the omitted category for
the funding mechanisms. Local is the omitted category for government level in the pooled
model. All standard errors are robust to clustering at the jurisdiction level. One, two, or three
asterisks indicate signi￿cance at the levels p < 0.10, p < 0.05, or p < 0.01, respectively.
14accrue in a fund with nonspeci￿c future bene￿ts. Third, the costs of a bond may be delayed
compared to the immediate costs of a tax increase. Fourth, citizens may not have a clear idea
about the costs of bonds, whereas the costs of tax increases are readily apparent. Note that
each of these possible explanations con￿ icts with the general notion of Ricardian equivalence,
which implies that citizens should be indi⁄erent between the di⁄erent funding mechanisms.
Thus, we conclude that either Ricardian equivalence does not hold in this context, or that
voters are subject to a form of ￿scal illusion.
Before looking at the results for the funding rates, it is important to recognize that stan-
dard price e⁄ects do not apply. While one might expect a higher funding rate to decrease
support for an initiative, this need not be the case. The reason is that open-space acquisitions
are endogenous to the funding level￿ that is, higher rates enable the purchase of more (or
higher valued) land. Voters must therefore consider two e⁄ects that occur with an increase
in the funding rate. One e⁄ect is having to pay more oneself. The other is enjoying the ad-
ditional (or higher valued) open space generated by revenues from all taxpayers. The former
e⁄ect decreases a voter￿ s welfare, while the latter e⁄ect increases it. Thus, the sign of the
coe¢ cients on the funding rates can be interpreted as an indicator of which e⁄ect dominates.
Negative coe¢ cients would suggest that the e⁄ect of having to pay more oneself dominates;
positive coe¢ cients would suggest that the spillin e⁄ect of greater revenues dominates.
The results provide evidence in both directions. In the local model, all funding rate
coe¢ cients are negative, suggesting that higher funding rates decrease voter support at the
local level. The coe¢ cient is statistically signi￿cant for the property tax and bond rates,
which are the most prevalent funding mechanisms in the data set. The results are di⁄erent
in the state-county model. The coe¢ cients on property tax and bond rates are both positive
and statistically signi￿cant. These di⁄ering results in the local and state-county models
can be explained with the two countervailing e⁄ects of having to pay more oneself versus
bene￿ting from spillins.
First consider a tax. A citizen￿ s personal tax burden does not depend on the political
jurisdiction￿ for example, a property tax increase of 1 mill imposes the same cost regardless
15of whether a state, county, or town collects the revenue. In contrast, one would expect the
spillins to be smaller in local jurisdictions than in states and counties. Thus, it would not
be surprising for the e⁄ect of the individual tax burden to dominate the spillin e⁄ect at the
local level, but not at the state or county level. This reasoning is consistent with Proptaxrate
having a negative e⁄ect in the local model and a positive e⁄ect in the state-county model.
Now consider how the e⁄ect of the bond rate may di⁄er between levels of government. In
this case, a voter￿ s personal cost of a bond does in fact depend on the political jurisdiction
because more people share the costs of a bond in a state or county than in a local jurisdiction.
In contrast, spillins for a given bond rate will not depend on the size of the jurisdiction,
assuming that the open-space acquisition is a public good. With bonds, therefore, one might
expect the individual burden e⁄ect to dominate at the local level, but not at the state and
county level. The results follow this pattern, as the coe¢ cient on Bondrate is negative in
the local model but positive in the state-county model.
Another factor that may in￿ uence voting outcomes is whether the referendum extends
an existing policy or initiates a new one. The results provide evidence that voters were more
likely to reauthorize an existing open-space policy. The coe¢ cient on Extend is positive in
all three models and statistically signi￿cant in the pooled and state-county models. The
magnitude of the coe¢ cient in the state-county model implies that, starting from 60 percent
of the voters voting yes, having the initiative be an extension increases the percent voting
yes to 73.1 percent￿ a substantial increase. This result is intuitive because jurisdictions with
extensions have already revealed a preference and willingness to pay for open space.
Fewer of the socioeconomic variables are statistically signi￿cant. In the local model, the
coe¢ cient on Population is positive and signi￿cant, indicating that voters in local jurisdic-
tions with larger populations are more likely to vote yes, due possibly to the spillin e⁄ects
discussed above. The coe¢ cient on Income is also positive and signi￿cant, implying that
publicly provided open space is a normal good. Other studies have found mixed results for
the income e⁄ect: some ￿nd evidence that open space is normal good (Bre› e, Morey, and
Lodder, 1998; Bates and Santerre, 2001), some ￿nd no signi￿cant e⁄ect (Deacon and Shapiro,
161975; Kline and Wichelns, 1994; Romero and Liserio, 2002), and one study ￿nds that open
space is generally a normal good but may become inferior at high levels of income (Kahn
and Matsusaka, 1997).16 None of the socioeconomic variables has statistically signi￿cant
explanatory power in the state-county model.17
While the nationwide analysis illuminates some of the factors that in￿ uence voter support
for open-space referenda, it does not shed light on why these referenda occur in the ￿rst
place. An open-space referendum is not a random event, but an outgrowth of economic,
political, and environmental factors that motivate citizens and lawmakers to put open-space
initiatives on the ballot. In the following studies of New Jersey and Massachusetts, we
address the question of what factors in￿ uence the occurrence of an open-space referendum,
in addition to the question of what factors in￿ uence voting results.
4.2 New Jersey
New Jersey is the most highly represented state in the data set. Since 1989 state legislation
has been in place that enables local jurisdictions to impose property taxes for the purpose
of open-space acquisition. The state approved further legislation in 1997, called the Green
Acres Planning Incentive Program, to provide matching funds to municipalities that adopt
open-space property taxes. In order to encourage immediate acquisition of open space, an
additional provision of the legislation was that communities can receive two-percent interest
loans from the state upon approval of a property tax increase.
Between 1998 and 2003, a total of 237 property-tax referenda took place in 178 di⁄erent
local jurisdictions in New Jersey. Fifty-nine of these referenda occurred in jurisdictions that
held at least one prior referendum over the same period. We investigate all of the New
Jersey election outcomes, along with the additional question of what factors contribute to
16We attempted to replicate Kahn and Matsusaka￿ s (1997) result by estimating all of the models with
inclusion of a squared term for median household income. While the same pattern emerged, neither of the
income coe¢ cients were statistically signi￿cant.
17We do not include Homevalue in any of the regressions in Table 3 because it is highly correlated with
Income. Inclusion of both variables renders neither statistically signi￿cant in all models.
17the appearance of a referendum in a jurisdiction. To accomplish this, we use socioeconomic
data for all 566 local jurisdictions in New Jersey. We then estimate the logit model speci￿ed
in (4) to explain whether or not a referenda occurred as a function of each jurisdiction￿ s
socioeconomic characteristics. The dependent variable equals 1 if the jurisdiction held at
least one open-space referendum between 1998 and 2003, and it equals 0 otherwise.
The logit model is reported in the ￿rst column of Table 4. The results reveal several
di⁄erences between jurisdictions that held open-space referenda and those that did not. Ju-
risdictions with higher populations were more likely to hold a referendum. Higher population
growth between 1990 and 2000 also raises the likelihood of an open-space initiative. This
result is not surprising because greater population growth is typically associated with more
development, making open-space conservation a more salient issue in faster growing com-
munities. The coe¢ cient on Density is negative and implies that greater population density
has a negative e⁄ect on the probability of a referendum occurring. This result is intuitive to
the extent that greater density implies less ￿sprawled￿development, as is often suggested.18
This interpretation should be done with caution, however. While low population density may
re￿ ect widespread low-density development, it may also re￿ ect high levels of undeveloped
land. In the latter case, the negative coe¢ cient on density could be the result of Tiebout
sorting, whereby people who value open space highly and are therefore more likely to support
ballot initiatives also settle in areas where open space already exists.
Other results from the logit model are that income and home value are both statistically
signi￿cant but have opposite signs. Higher income jurisdictions are more likely to hold an
open-space referenda, and jurisdictions with higher home values are less likely to hold an
open-space referendum. These results are consistent with open space being a normal good
and higher home values implying a greater tax burden for a given property tax increase.
We now turn to the WLS estimates of model (5) in order to explain election results in
New Jersey. Mirroring the nationwide analysis, we include the variables Proptaxrate, Extend,
18Our results on population, population growth, and density are consistent with Howell-Moroney￿ s (2004)
￿ndings in the Delaware Valley region.
18Table 4: New Jersey Logit and WLS regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Logit WLS All Obs. WLS No Repeat
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Proptaxrate ￿ ￿ -0.544 (0.398) -0.869￿ (0.443)
Extend ￿ ￿ 0.001 (0.109) -0.105 (0.156)
Farm ￿ ￿ 0.181￿￿ (0.091) 0.278￿￿￿ (0.106)
Repeat ￿ ￿ -0.467￿￿￿ (0.123) ￿ ￿
Priorpass ￿ ￿ 0.440￿￿￿ (0.166) ￿ ￿
Population 2.450￿￿￿ (0.516) -0.224 (0.195) -0.166 (0.176)
Popnchg 0.460￿ (0.283) 0.016 (0.047) 0.116 (0.146)
Density -0.297￿￿￿ (0.066) 0.033 (0.032) 0.047 (0.034)
Under18 -1.973 (3.480) -0.698 (1.698) -0.728 (1.785)
Over65 0.763 (2.565) 1.442￿ (0.861) 1.547 (0.967)
Income 0.472￿￿￿ (0.126) 0.104 (0.075) 0.153￿ (0.081)
Homevalue -0.494￿￿ (0.198) -0.225 (0.142) -0.293￿￿ (0.141)
Homeown 0.688 (1.188) 0.039 (0.637) 0.341 (0.683)
Constant -2.744￿￿ (1.158) -0.012 (0.570) -0.522 (0.623)
Year dummies ￿ Yes Yes
Observations 566 227 170
Log Likelihood -286.28 ￿ ￿
R-squared ￿ 0.33 0.36
Notes: The dependent variable in the logit model is equal to 1 if the jurisdiction ever held a
referendum and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in the WLS model is logoddsi. Standard
errors in column (2) are robust to clustering at the jurisdiction level. One, two, or three
asterisks indicate signi￿cance at the levels p < 0.10, p < 0.05, or p < 0.01, respectively.
19and Farm. Because of the relatively high proportion of jurisdictions that held more than one
referendum, we include two additional variables to investigate the interaction between repeat
initiatives. Repeat is a dummy variable indicating whether the jurisdiction had one or more
prior open-space referenda within the study period. Priorpass is a dummy variable indicating
whether one or more of the prior referenda were passed. We estimate the model using all
of the New Jersey referenda that were part of the Green Acres Program.19 These results
are reported in the second column of Table 4. Once again, the reported standard errors are
robust to clustering at the jurisdiction level. For purposes of comparison, we also estimate
the model excluding referenda that were repeat initiatives within a jurisdiction. While this
model is based on fewer observations, it enables us to focus on ￿rst-time referenda and to
report unclustered standard errors that are not biased. These results are reported in the
third column of Table 4.
Both models generate similar results, although di⁄er somewhat with respect to the co-
e¢ cients that are statistically signi￿cant. The e⁄ect of Proptaxrate is negative, but only
signi￿cant in the model without repeat observations. For ￿rst-time referenda, the magni-
tude of the coe¢ cient implies that an increase in the property tax rate of 0.1 mills decreases
the proportion of yes votes from 60 percent to 57.8 percent on average. The fact that voter
support appears to be not very responsive to the property tax rate is consistent with other
research that ￿nds demand for open space to be price inelastic (Bates and Santerre, 2001).
This may also explain why the e⁄ect is not statistically signi￿cant when all observations are
included, in which case there is the confounding factor of repeat referenda.
The negative and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient on Repeat indicates that voters are
less supportive of subsequent ballot initiatives in their jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the positive
and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient on Priorpass indicates that if a prior initiative passed,
the e⁄ect of Repeat is attenuated. In fact, the two e⁄ects are statistically o⁄setting according
to a test of whether the two coe¢ cients sum to zero (t = 0.20, p = 0.84). Thus, voting
19This includes all 237 referenda that occurred in New Jersey; however, only 227 observations are used in
the estimation. The reason for the di⁄erence is that data for Proptaxrate was missing for 10 observations.
20outcomes for referenda in jurisdictions that have already passed an open-space initiative are
statistically indistinguishable from those having never held a referendum.
New Jersey voters are more likely to favor local farmland preservation than nonagricul-
tural open space. The coe¢ cient on Farm is positive and statistically signi￿cant, although
the magnitude is small. This result corroborates Kline￿ s and Wichelns￿(1998) ￿nding that
individuals prefer farmland to most other types of open space. One possible reason is the
active role that nongovernmental organizations such as the American Farmland Trust play
in promoting farmland conservation.
Three of the socioeconomic variables are statistically signi￿cant. The positive coe¢ cient
on Over65 implies that a higher proportion of senior citizens in a jurisdiction increases voter
support. While this e⁄ect is not signi￿cant in the model without repeats, the e⁄ects of Income
and Homevalue are statistically signi￿cant. These results follow the same pattern as that in
the logit model. Greater income increases voter support in addition to the probability of a
referendum occurring. In contrast, greater home value decreases voter support in addition
to the probability of a referendum occurring.
4.3 Massachusetts
The Massachusetts Community Preservation Act (CPA) was passed in 2000. The law is
similar to New Jersey￿ s Green Acres program in that it o⁄ers state matching funds to com-
munities that raise property taxes for open-space conservation.20 Rather than levying a
property tax millage, however, the CPA authorizes communities to levy a surcharge of up
to 3 percent on existing property tax bills. Optional provisions of the policy include three
exemptions from the surcharge: one for low-income families and low- to moderate-income
senior citizens; one for the ￿rst $100,000 of the tax-assessed value of all properties; and one
20In addition to promoting open space, the CPA is intended to promote historic preservation and a⁄ordable
housing. The law requires that at least 10 percent of the total funding be spent on each of the three objectives,
with the remaining 70 percent allocated at the local legislature￿ s discretion. Speci￿c allocations were not
speci￿ed prior to elections. To date, approximately 42 percent of CPA-funded projects have been for open-
space and recreation (Community Preservation Coalition, 2004a).
21for commercial and industrial properties.
Our analysis of local voting outcomes that were part of the CPA follows the same method-
ology that we use in the New Jersey analysis. We collected socioeconomic data for all 351
local jurisdictions in Massachusetts, of which 115 held a CPA referendum.21 In order to
account for the di⁄erent exemptions, we collected further data from the Community Preser-
vation Coalition (2004b) on which exemptions applied to each referendum. From this data
we generated three dummy variables￿ Lowinc, First100K, and Comind￿ to indicate whether
the respective exemption applied. There were eight jurisdictions that had two ballot initia-
tives. Since the ￿rst attempt failed in all eight of these jurisdictions, there is no Priorpass
variable for Massachusetts.
The ￿rst column of Table 5 reports the logit model for whether a jurisdiction held a refer-
endum. Many of the results mirror those for New Jersey. Referenda are more likely to occur
in wealthier, larger, and faster growing jurisdictions that have lower population densities. In
Massachusetts the e⁄ect of Under18 is statistically signi￿cant, and the coe¢ cient￿ s negative
sign indicates that a higher proportion of the population under the age of 18 decreases voter
support. In contrast to New Jersey, the e⁄ect of Homevalue is positive and statistically
signi￿cant. Di⁄erences in the ￿nancing mechanisms may contribute to this divergence. The
negative coe¢ cient on Homevalue in the New Jersey model was explained by the direct re-
lationship between home value and the tax price faced by a homeowner. This relationship
is less direct with the CPA￿ s property tax surcharges, which imply tax prices that are less
dependent on property values than an increase in property tax rates. As a result, Homevalue
may be capturing less of a price e⁄ect and more of a wealth e⁄ect in Massachusetts.
The WLS estimates of the log-odds model are reported in the second column of Table 5.
We include all of the referenda in the estimation and report clustered standard errors.22 The
21Beyond the observations included in LandVote, we obtained data on the six CPA referenda that occurred
between January and July of 2004. These data are available from the Community Preservation Coalition
(2004b). These referenda were not included in the full data set, since comparably up-to-date information
was not available for the rest of the country.
22We do not report estimates of the model excluding the repeat observations. Because there are so few of
repeat observations in Massachusetts, the results are nearly identical to those reported in Table 5.
22Table 5: Massachusetts Logit and WLS regressions
(1) (2)
Logit WLS
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Proptaxsurrate ￿ ￿ -0.161￿￿￿ (0.063)
Lowinc ￿ ￿ 0.260￿￿ (0.112)
First100K ￿ ￿ -0.117 (0.141)
Comind ￿ ￿ -0.126 (0.125)
Repeat ￿ ￿ -0.295 (0.189)
Population 2.124￿￿ (0.878) -0.061 (0.047)
Popnchg 2.583￿￿ (1.110) -0.018 (0.548)
Density -0.191￿￿ (0.096) 0.029 (0.026)
Under18 -16.049￿￿￿ (5.219) -4.841￿￿ (2.207)
Over65 0.827 (3.672) -5.783￿￿￿ (1.472)
Income 0.346￿￿ (0.167) -0.086 (0.067)
Homevalue 0.509￿￿ (0.259) 0.227￿￿ (0.089)
Homeown 0.770 (1.760) 2.009￿￿ (0.829)
Constant -0.730 (1.700) 0.442 (0.593)
Year dummies ￿ Yes
Observations 359 122
Log Likelihood -200.91 ￿
R-squared ￿ 0.42
Notes: The dependent variable in the logit model is equal to 1 if the
jurisdiction ever held a referendum and 0 otherwise. The dependent
variable in the WLS model is logoddsi. Standard errors in the WLS
model are robust to clustering at the jurisdiction level. One, two, or
three asterisks indicate signi￿cance at the levels p < 0.10, p < 0.05,
or p < 0.01, respectively.
23surcharge rate has a negative and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on voting outcomes. The
magnitude of the e⁄ect is such that starting from the average of 51 percent of the voters
voting yes, a 1 percent increase in the surcharge rate would drop the number of yes votes to
47 percent. Given the marginal pass rate of most CPA referenda, this e⁄ect appears pivotal
to many of the election outcomes. Since the average surcharge rate is 2.4 percent among
the CPA referenda, it appears that many unsuccessful ballot initiatives might have been
successful with a more modest surcharge rate.
Of the three exemptions, only the low-income family and low- to moderate-income elderly
exemption has a statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect. The positive sign of the coe¢ cient is intuitive,
as those who can least a⁄ord a tax increase and are likely to pay a relatively small share are
exempt from having to pay it. Sixty-seven percent of the referenda had this exemption. The
insigni￿cance of the other two exemptions may be due to insu¢ cient variation in the data.
Almost all of the referenda had the exemption on the ￿rst $100,000 (84 percent), while very
few had the commercial and industrial exemption (10 percent).
While the e⁄ect of Repeat is not signi￿cant in the CPA model, several of the socioeconomic
variables have statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients. The coe¢ cients on Under18 and Over65
have the same sign as those in the logit model. Higher proportions of senior citizens and
children not only decrease the probability of a referendum occurring; they also reduce voter
support in actual elections. The e⁄ect of Homevalue is also similar to that in the logit model.
Higher home values increase the proportion of yes votes, in addition to the probability of a
referendum occurring. Homeown is positive and signi￿cant, perhaps because home owners
are more likely to be long term residents and stand to bene￿t from the value of open-space
being capitalized in property values.23
23Hedonic studies have found evidence that open space has a positive e⁄ect on residential property values
(e.g., Irwin, 2002; Smith, Poulos, and Kim, 2002).
245 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to provide an empirical investigation of the factors that in￿ uence
the appearance and success of voter referenda for open-space conservation. We take advan-
tage of a data set that includes detailed information on all such referenda that occurred in
the United States between 1998 and 2003. Combining these data with information from the
U.S. Census, we conduct a nationwide analysis along with focused analyses in New Jersey
and Massachusetts. Five general questions motivate the paper. We reiterate these questions
here to organize our main conclusions.
What factors contribute to the appearance of an open-space referendum in a jurisdiction?
Across the nation, jurisdictions that have held open-space referenda di⁄er from national
averages in several respects. They tend to have greater population growth, greater household
incomes, greater home values, and greater home ownership rates. A similar pattern emerges
in models that explain the probability of a referendum occurring in local jurisdictions in New
Jersey and Massachusetts. In these models, population density is also a signi￿cant predictor
of whether or not a referendum occurs: jurisdictions with lower density, which may proxy
for more ￿urban sprawl,￿are more likely to have held an open-space referendum.
How does an initiative￿ s funding mechanism a⁄ect the way citizens vote? Voters are far
more likely to vote in favor of an open-space policy that approves bond ￿nancing rather
than a tax increase. Bonds are preferred to a variety of tax types, including property taxes,
property tax surcharges, sales taxes, and income tax surcharges. This preference holds
regardless of whether the referendum is held at the local, state, or county level. In many
cases, the di⁄erence between ￿nancing with a bond or a tax determines whether a referendum
passes or fails.
How responsive are favorable votes to the funding rates of an open-space initiative? Fund-
ing rates can a⁄ect a voter￿ s incentives in two ways. Higher rates imply that each voter must
pay more. At the same time, higher rates imply more open-space provision and spillin ben-
e￿ts for each voter. These two e⁄ects explain di⁄erences in voting behavior at the local and
state-county levels. At the local level￿ where spillin e⁄ects are likely to be small￿ higher
25funding rates decrease voter support. At the state-county level￿ where spillin e⁄ects are
likely to be large￿ higher funding rates increase voter support.
How do socioeconomic characteristics in￿uence demand and therefore voting results for
open-space conservation? We ￿nd evidence that collectively provided open space is a normal
good. Jurisdictions with greater household income more likely to have held an open-space
referendum and to exhibit greater voter support. While property values, home ownership
rates, and age pro￿les have a signi￿cant e⁄ect in many of the econometric models, general
results for these variables do not emerge across all models.
What other features of a referendum a⁄ect voting outcomes? Not surprisingly, voter
support for an open-space referendum that extends an existing policy is greater than support
for a referendum that proposes a new policy. In New Jersey, having held more than one open-
space referendum decreases voter support￿ unless one of the prior referenda passed, in which
case voters are just as likely to support additional initiatives. New Jersey voters are also
more supportive of open-space policies that include provisions for local farmland preservation.
Exemptions can also have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on voter support. In Massachusetts, the odds
of a yes vote were greater for policies that included an exemption for low-income families
and low- to moderate-income senior citizens.
In conclusion, this paper provides new insights into the factors that in￿ uence the appear-
ance and success of voter referenda for open-space conservation. While many of the results
corroborate ￿ndings in the existing literature, other results are new. Most notably, this
study provides the ￿rst investigation of how funding mechanisms and funding rates a⁄ect
voter support for public acquisition of open space. As open-space initiatives continue to gain
popularity at the ballot box, the descriptive insights of this paper should prove useful for
both policy-makers and advocates working in the area of land use management.
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